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Highlights
• Utilizing a real options approach, we develop an investment and financ-
ing model with a partial guarantee.
• We explicitly derive the pricing and timing of the option to invest for
the cash flow with both diffusion and jump risk.
• If the funding gap rises, the option value decreases but the investment
threshold first declines and then increases.
• The larger the guarantee level, the lower the option value and the later
the investment.
• Raising guarantee levels reduce borrowers’ risk-shifting incentives but
do not change their incentives to replenish equity.
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Abstract
We consider a small- and medium-sized enterprise (SME) with a funding gap
intending to invest in a project, of which the cash flow follows a double expo-
nential jump-diffusion process. In contrast to traditional corporate finance
theory, we assume the SME is unable to get a loan directly from a bank
and hence it enters into a partial guarantee agreement with an insurer and
a lender. Utilizing a real options approach, we develop an investment and
financing model with a partial guarantee. We explicitly derive the pricing
and timing of the option to invest. We find that if the funding gap rises, the
option value decreases but its investment threshold first declines and then
increases. The larger the guarantee level, the lower the option value and the
later the investment. The optimal coupon rate decreases with project risk
and a growth of the guarantee level can effectively reduce agency conflicts.
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Double exponential jump-diffusion process
JEL: G11, G13, G32
1. Introduction
Motivation. Small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs, henceforth) are the
engine of the world economy. They provide a large number of job opportu-
nities and create entrepreneurial spirit and technique innovation. Thus, they
are crucial for fostering competitiveness and employment. Unfortunately,
SMEs are severely limited by borrowing constraints when they have oppor-
tunities to invest in a project for business expansion. Particularly, they
might not be able to borrow from banks at all, or they are offered with un-
favourable lending conditions. As a result, they have to abandon potentially
valuable investment opportunities. This situation becomes worse after the
recent financial crisis. As reported by World Business Environment Survey,
on average 43 (resp. 11) percent of businesses with 20 to 99 employees rate
access to finance or cost of finance as a major constraint in developing (resp.
developed) countries.1 Indeed, SMEs incur more financing obstacles than
large firms due to SMEs’ low credibility and strong information asymmetry
between lenders and borrowers, see, e.g., Andrikopoulos (2009). To alleviate
this problem, Kang (2005) among others suggests that credit guarantees are
effective in improving SMEs’ credibility and information disclosure. In par-
ticular, Xiang and Yang (2015) develop a simple model and show that credit
guarantees can completely eliminate the financing constraints in theory.
1Enterprise Surveys Database 2010; http://www.enterprisesurveys.org; “World Busi-
ness Environment Survey” of more than 10,000 firms in 80 countries.
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In reality, SMEs heavily rely upon credit guarantees for corporate financ-
ing in Asia, see the BIS Quarterly Review (Shim, 2006). In particular, Chi-
nese entrepreneurs have invented a flexible and popular guarantee agreement,
called a partial guarantee swap, which avoids incentive distortions usually
caused by the existing government guarantee schemes of China. However,
there are no papers to provide a quantitative research for such swap, let
alone consider how to invest with it under a state-of-the-art jump-diffusion
model.
Our work. In this paper, we consider an SME who intends to invest in an
irreversible project with entry flexibility but has a funding gap. After the
irreversible investment, the project generates the cash flow that follows a
double exponential jump-diffusion process. In contrast to traditional cor-
porate finance theory, we assume that the SME is unable to obtain a loan
directly from a bank because of high project risk, low credibility, and strong
information asymmetry. To overcome such financing constraint, the SME
enters into a partial guarantee agreement with an insurer and a lender. Ac-
cording to the agreement, the lender lends cash to the SME and the insurer
promises to undertake a fraction (guarantee level) of debt once the SME de-
faults. In return, the SME (borrower) allocates a fraction of equity and a
fixed guarantee fee rate per unit time to the insurer.
We develop a real options model and discuss the SME’s investment and
financing strategies given the partial guarantee contract above. We derive
the explicit formulas for the pricing and timing of the option to invest for
the cash flow with both diffusion and jump risk. The two sources of project
risk increase the option value and postpone investment. More importantly,
4
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we reveal that larger funding gaps or higher guarantee levels lead to the later
investment and lower option values. Interestingly, raising the guarantee level
can effectively reduce the borrower’s moral hazard to increase equity values
at the expense of the lender. Meanwhile, a growth in the guarantee level
does not change the SME’s incentive to replenish equity.
Literature review. Our work relates to the real options literature that takes
into account the interaction between investment and financing decisions. My-
ers (1977) and Jensen and Meckling (1979) focus on the impact of stockholder-
bondholder conflicts on a firm’s financing and investment decisions. Boyle
and Guthrie (2003) examine the effect of a financing constraint on investment
timing and find that the financial constraint accelerates investment because
the threat of future funding shortfalls lowers the value of waiting. Belhaj and
Djembissi (2009) point out that debt financing costs reduce tax shields and
consequently force entrepreneurs to postpone investment. Hirth and Uhrig-
Homburg (2010) and Shibata and Nishihara (2015) illustrate that the invest-
ment threshold of a firm is a non-monotonic function of debt financing costs
or debt issuance limits. Sundaresan, Wang and Yang (2015) develop a dy-
namic investment and financing model to investigate stockholder-bondholder
conflicts.
The dynamics of cash flow generated by the project determines the pricing
and timing of the option to invest. There are two kinds of well-known models
to describe the dynamics: stochastic volatility models and the jump-diffusion
processes. The latter seems more suitable to describe the dynamics of cash
flow for a SME. A jump-diffusion model is first introduced by Merton (1976)
to option pricing. Recently, a new jump-diffusion model, named the double
5
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exponential jump-diffusion process, is attracting more research interests due
to two appealing properties of the double exponential distribution (Kou,
2002). First, its two-sided jumps and the leptokurtic feature of jump size lead
to the peak and heavy tails of return distribution found in reality. Second,
the double exponential distribution has a memoryless feature which facilitates
the calculation of conditional means and variances. In such jump-diffusion
framework, Kou and Wang (2003) study the first hitting time. Kou and
Wang (2004) derive the solution for valuing an American option, and Chen
and Kou (2009) investigate a variety of credit spreads. However, to the best
of our knowledge, there are seldom papers studying real options with this
well-behaved jump-diffusion model.
Our paper is also related with Yang and Zhang (2013), Yang and Zhang
(2015a), Yang and Zhang (2015b), Xiang and Yang (2015), and Wang et al.
(2015) which study an equity-for-guarantee swap or an option-for-guarantee
swap. However, the flexible partial guarantee we discuss here is actually more
popular with entrepreneurs due to its extra advantage. Specifically, SMEs
can enter into a “personalized” guarantee contract by choosing appropriate
combinations of a fixed guarantee fee and a fraction of equity as guaran-
tee costs according to their investment projects. Moreover, to the best of
our knowledge, all previous studies do not consider a real options problem
based on a double exponential jump-diffusion process, let alone considering
investment with a partial guarantee.
The structure of the article is as follows. Section 2 develops a model and
discusses the pricing and timing of the option to invest. Section 3 presents
numerical results and comparative static analysis. Section 4 concludes. The
6
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Appendices present mathematical details and derivations.
2. The pricing and timing under a partial guarantee
The model. We assume an SME has a monopolistic and perpetual option to
implement an irreversible investment project incurring a sunk cost I. The
cash flow of the project before interest is observable and independent of
the SME’s capital structure. In contrast to a common continuous cash flow
model, we assume the cash flow δ follows a double exponential jump-diffusion
process of Chen and Kou (2009) under a given risk-neutral probability Q,
i.e.
dδt
δt−
= µdt+ σdBt + d
(
Nt∑
i=1
(Zi − 1)
)
− λξdt, (1)
where µ is a constant risk-adjusted growth rate, σ is a constant volatility,
and the process {Bt, t ≥ 0} is a standard Brownian motion under Q. In
addition, for the jump part, ξ is the mean percentage jump size given by
(A.4), {Nt, t ≥ 0} is a Q-Poisson process with a constant intensity rate
λ > 0, and the Zi’s are i.i.d nonnegative random variables. We assume all
sources of randomness N , B, Zi are independent under Q.
We note that on the contrary to large companies, SMEs in fact can seldom
issue bonds directly. To overcome such financing constraint, we introduce a
new swap agreement among a borrower (SME), a lender (bank), and an
insurer in contrast to the well-known corporate finance theory. Under the
agreement, the bank lends at a given interest rate to the SME and if it
defaults on the loan, the insurer must pay a certain part of the outstanding
interest and principal to the bank. In return for the guarantee, the SME
7
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must allocate a fraction of its equity and a given guarantee fee rate to the
insurer.
Specifically, after debt financing is provided, an SME pays a fixed coupon
payment C per unit of time to the bank when the project is alive. After
bankruptcy, the insurer pays a fixed payment kC (0 ≤ k ≤ 1) per unit of
time to the bank instead of the SME. The insurer gains a fraction ψ of the
SME’s equity together with a fixed cash guarantee fee rate g per unit of time
only if default does not happen. The bankruptcy threshold is endogenously
decided by the SME. When the firm goes bankrupt, the insurer takes over
the remaining asset of the firm, suffering bankruptcy loss rate α (0 < α < 1).
In addition, we assume the borrower incurs a proportional debt issuance cost
sK (0 ≤ s < 1), where K is the amount of money borrowed.
The pricing of corporate securities. According to asset pricing theory, the
value of a claim is given by the sum of its expected cash flow discounted at
the risk-free interest rate r, where the expectation is taken with respect to
the risk-neutral probability measure Q. For this reason, the value A(δt) of
the total cash flow δ is
A(δt) = EQt
[∫ ∞
t
e−r(s−t)δsds
]
=
δt
r − µ, t ≥ 0. (2)
There are four important parameters characterizing the double exponen-
tial jump process δ. They are four roots β1, β2, −β3, and −β4 of the equation
G(β) = r, where G(β) is given by (A.5).
8
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
According to Appendix A, the value E(δt) of equity is given by
E(δt) = (1− χe)EQt
[∫ τd
t
e−r(s−t)(δs − C − g)ds
]
= (1− χe)
{
δt
r−µ − C+gr
[
1− b1
(
δd
δt
)β3 − b2 ( δdδt )β4]
− δd
r−µ
[
b3
(
δd
δt
)β3
+ b4
(
δd
δt
)β4]}
,
(3)
where b1, b2, b3 and b4 are given in Appendix B, and the stopping time
τd = inf{s ≥ t : δt ≤ δd}. We let 1 − χe = (1 − χd)(1 − χf ), here χd is the
tax rate of the effective dividends and χf is the tax rate of corporate profits.
The guarantee contract follows the widely-used assumption that the SME
is able to make default decision endogenously to maximize the value of equity.
Accordingly, the high-contact condition holds at the optimal bankruptcy
boundary δ∗d, i.e.
∂E(δt)
∂δt
∣∣∣∣
δt=δ∗d
= 0. (4)
Solving (4) leads to
δ∗d =
(r − µ)(C + g)
r
η2 + 1
η2
β3β4
(β3 + 1)(β4 + 1)
. (5)
In the same way, after bankruptcy the value of debt undertaken by the
insurer, P (δt), is
P (δt) = EQt
[∫ ∞
τd
e−r(τd−t)kCds
]
=
kC
r
[
b1
(
δd
δt
)β3
+ b2
(
δd
δt
)β4]
. (6)
The value of debt D(δt) is given by
D(δt) = (1− χp)EQt
[∫ τd
t
e−r(s−t)Cds
]
+ (1− χp)P (δt)
= (1− χp)C
r
{
1− (1− k)
[
b1
(
δd
δt
)β3
+ b2
(
δd
δt
)β4]}
, (7)
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where χp is the personal tax rate of the interest payment. The value of cash
guarantee fee U(δt) with the fixed rate g is
U(δt) = (1− χp)EQt
[∫ τd
t
e−r(s−t)gds
]
= (1− χp)g
r
{
1−
[
b1
(
δd
δt
)β3
+ b2
(
δd
δt
)β4]}
. (8)
The remaining value R(δt) of the firm net of bankruptcy costs is
R(δt) = (1− χe)EQt [e−r(τd−t)(1− α)Aτd ]
= (1− χe)(1− α) δd
r − µ
[
b3
(
δd
δt
)β3
+ b4
(
δd
δt
)β4]
. (9)
We assume that there are no arbitrage and other transaction costs except
the debt financing cost. Hence, the value that the insurer receives should
equal the value that s/he pays for a fair guarantee swap. In other words, the
following equation must hold:
ψE(δt) + U(δt) +R(δt) = P (δt), (10)
where ψ is the fraction of the SME equity allocated to the insurer. Therefore,
we have
ψ =
P (δt)− U(δt)−R(δt)
E(δt)
(11)
and the total firm’s value V (δt) is
V (δt) = E(δt) +D(δt)− ψE(δt)− sD(δt). (12)
The pricing and timing of the option to invest. Now we solve the problem of
pricing and timing of the option to invest under a given swap defined in the
10
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proceeding text. Let F (δt) be the value of the option to invest in a project
that generates the cash flow following the time homogeneous Markov process
(1). To compute the optimal investment time, it suffices to consider the
stopping time τu = inf{δt ≥ δu} for an investment threshold δu. Therefore,
we have
F (δt) = max
δu≥δt
EQt [e−r(τu−t)(V (δτu)− I)]. (13)
The optimal investment threshold δ∗u satisfies the following high-contact con-
dition:
∂F (δt)
∂δt
∣∣∣∣
δt=δ∗u
=
∂V (δt)
∂δt
∣∣∣∣
δt=δ∗u
. (14)
The optimal investment threshold δ∗u and the value of the option to invest
are explicitly presented in Appendix B.
3. Numerical results and analysis
Baseline parameter values. To make a reasonable comparison, the parameter
values for the jump part are taken from Kou and Wang (2004), i.e. p = 0.6
(q = 0.4), η1 = 25, η2 = 50, and the jump intensity λ = 7. For the diffusion
part we take the annualized risk-free interest rate r = 0.05, volatility σ = 0.3,
bankruptcy loss rate α = 0.35, and effective corporate tax rate χe = 0.2
following Andrikopoulos (2009). The risk-adjusted growth rate µ = 0.01
following Goldstein et al. (2001) since we assume the growth rate of an SME
is not too high. The marginal cost of debt financing s = 0.05, which falls in
the ballpark with the estimates (6.09%) in Eckbo et al. (2007). The interest
payments are taxed at a personal rate χp = 0.1 falling in the tax ranges in
11
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(a) option value versus project risk
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(b) investment trigger versus project risk
Figure 1: The figure displays (a) the value of the option and (b) the investment trigger
for different values of project risk .
many countries. We assume that the current cash flow rate δ0 = 1 and the
sunk cost I = 10 following Chen et al. (2010). We let the fixed guarantee
fee rate g = 0.01 and the guarantee level k = 0.6. These values exclude
some obviously uninteresting cases, such as an immediate default (δ0 < δb),
exercising the option immediately (δu < δ0), and a negative fraction (ψ < 0)
of equity contributing to guarantee costs. The coupon rate is optimal unless
otherwise stated, i.e. it is determined endogenously by maximaizing the value
of the SME.
The effects of project uncertainty on the pricing and timing of the option.
Figure 1(a) illustrates that as we expect, the value of the option to invest
increases with project risk. A similar conclusion is also pointed out by Kou
et al. (2005). Consistent with this result, Figure 1(b) states that the invest-
ment trigger is an increasing function of the project risk, which accords with
Kou et al. (2005). Actually, the two figures further document the well known
12
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
11.02
11.04
11.06
11.08
11.1
11.12
11.14
11.16
11.18
Debt value K
Fi
rm
 O
pt
io
n 
V
al
ue
 F
(δ)
 of
 In
ve
stm
en
t
(a) option value versus funding gap
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1.565
1.57
1.575
1.58
1.585
1.59
Debt value K
In
ve
st
m
en
t T
rig
ge
r  
δ u
(b) investment trigger versus funding gap
Figure 2: The figure plots (a) the value of the option and (b) the investment trigger for
different funding gaps (debt values), where the coupon rate varies accordingly with the
funding gap.
conclusion in real options theory, i.e. the larger the project risk, the higher
the value of the option to invest and the later the investment time.
The effects of a funding gap on the pricing and timing of the option. Accord-
ing to pecking order theory in corporate finance, a borrower (SME) should
only borrow the minimum money for starting a project. We acknowledge this
theory and examine the case where only the funding gap is financed through
borrowing. Accordingly, we utilize Figures 2(a) and 2(b) to describe how the
funding gap, i.e. the debt value K, impacts on the pricing and timing of the
option while the coupon rate varies accordingly with the gap. It turns out
that as the gap rises, the option value decreases but the investment threshold
first descends and then increases. The former happens because there are a
financing cost and an extra tax on the payment of the insurer to the lender
due to the guarantee. As a matter of fact, the insurer and the lender have a
13
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zero net gain or loss from the guarantee agreement, i.e. the tax shields or loss
and bankruptcy costs are totally harvested or incurred at last by the SME.
Therefore, a larger gap requires the SME to pay more financing costs and
more extra amount in tax, which induces a deduction in the option value.
The effects of guarantee level on investment option. To explore the effects of
guarantee level k on the pricing and timing of the option to invest, we take a
fixed funding gap K = 9, while the coupon rate C varies accordingly. Figures
3(a) and 3(b) indicate that the option value deceases but the investment
threshold increases with the guarantee level. Because of the aforementioned
arguments in the last paragraph, these observations follow from the fact
that a growth of guarantee level not only leads to a larger extra amount in
tax paid by the insurer, ceteris paribus, but also decreases the coupon rate.
Indeed, a smaller coupon rate implies a lower tax shield, though it reduces
the bankruptcy costs by decreasing the default threshold from (5).
The effects of project risk on optimal capital structure. Xiang and Yang
(2015) show that an SME can totally eliminate financing constraints thanks
to an equity-for-guarantee swap. For this reason, the coupon rate could be
endogenously determined under a guarantee swap. In other words, the en-
trepreneur could take an optimal capital structure to maximize the SME
value, though s/he has to pay the corresponding guarantee costs. Figure
4(a) plots that the optimal coupon rate decreases with project risk. This
phenomenon follows from two opposite forces. On one hand, the higher the
project risk, the larger the investment threshold as shown in Figure 1(b) and
the less the bankruptcy probability after exercising the option. Accordingly,
issuing more debt can obtain more tax shields while bankruptcy costs only
14
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Figure 3: The figure shows (a) the value of the option and (b) the investment trigger
for different guarantee levels. The given debt value is K=9 and the coupon rate changes
accordingly with the guarantee level.
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(a) optimal coupon versus project risk
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(b) optimal leverage versus project risk
Figure 4: The figure depicts (a) optimal coupon rate and (b) optimal leverage for different
values of project risk .
increase a little. As a result, the optimal coupon rate should increase. On
the other hand, a larger project risk leads to a higher default probability
15
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(a) insurer’s fraction versus guarantee level
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(b) insurer’s fraction versus project risk
Figure 5: The figure illustrates the fraction of equity allocated to the insurer for different
values of (a) guarantee level and (b) project risk.
and hence the SME should issue less debt, i.e. the coupon rate should be
reduced, to decrease bankruptcy costs. In addition, Figure 4(b) depicts that
the optimal leverage decreases with project risk, which means that the value
of the SME increases faster than the optimal debt level with project risk.
This phenomenon is not very obvious but is consistent with the conclusions
in Mauer and Sarkar (2005). In particular, under the assumption of our base-
line parameter values, the optimal leverage ratio is consistent with empirical
averages. For example, Hall et al. (2004) and Shim (2006) show that the
average debt leverage ratios range from 5 percent to 60 percent.
Guarantee costs versus guarantee level and project risk. Figure 5(a) plots
that at a given fixed guarantee fee g and coupon rate C = 0.8, the fraction of
equity allocated to the insurer increases with the debt guarantee level. This
is in agreement with intuition. Furthermore, it shows that at a low guarantee
level, the higher the jump risk, the larger the fraction but if the guarantee
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(b) Debt overhang versus guarantee level
Figure 6: The figure demonstrates (a) the risk-shifting incentive and (b) the debt overhang
for different values of debt guarantee level. The given coupon rate C = 0.8 and the profit
flow level δ = 1.8 after investment.
level is high enough, the opposite holds true. Figure 5(b) reveals further
that if the diffusive volatility is low, the fraction increases with project risk
but when the diffusive volatility is high, the fraction falls. This phenomenon
is caused by two opposite factors. One increases the fraction due to the
higher default probability generated from a larger project risk but the other
decreases the fraction since the value of equity increases with project risk and
therefore a smaller fraction of equity is enough in return for the guarantee.
Asset substitution and debt overhang. To compare two candidate capital
structures, we generally check the inefficiencies arising from asset substi-
tution and debt overhang. For the first inefficiency, we compute risk-shifting
incentives, which are measured by the rate of change of the borrower’s eq-
uity value with respect to the diffusive volatility of the project, i.e. (1−ψ)∂E
∂σ
.
The larger the rate, the stronger the risk-shifting incentive of the borrower.
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Consequently, Figure 6(a) demonstrates clearly that the risk-shifting incen-
tive decrease globally with the debt guarantee level. This conclusion further
explains that such guarantee not only totally eliminate the financing con-
straints as argued by Xiang and Yang (2015), but also dramatically decreases
the inefficiencies arising from asset substitution. To describe the second in-
efficiency, which arises from debt overhang, we compute the rate of change
of total equity value with respect to the total cash flow value A minus 1,
i.e. ∂E
∂A
− 1. It represents the net value received by shareholders after they
invest one unit of value in the firm. Figure 6(b) implies that this inefficiency
is invariant with the guarantee level.
4. Conclusions
There are a large number of SMEs all over the world undergoing financing
constraints, which have been inducing a huge loss of social welfare for a long
time. This problem has been attracting much attention from researchers and
practitioners.
In this paper, we solve an SME’s problem of pricing and timing of the
option to invest in a project, which generates the cash flow following a double
exponential jump-diffusion process. The SME has a funding gap to start the
project and the gap is financed by entering into a partial guarantee agree-
ment. We provide an explicit solution of the option value and the investment
threshold. We show that the option value and investment threshold increase
with project risk. If the funding gap rises, the option value decreases but
the investment threshold first declines and then increases. The larger the
guarantee level, the lower the option value and the later the investment. The
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optimal coupon rate and optimal leverage decrease with project risk. At a
given fixed guarantee fee rate, the guarantee level and project risk have an
ambiguous effect on the fraction of equity allocated to the insurer if coupon
rate varies accordingly to keep capital structure optimal. While debt over-
hang is independent of guarantee levels, the inefficiency arising from asset
substitution decreases as guarantee levels rise.
In essence, it is the most important role played by a partial guarantee that
the guarantee succeeds in exchanging a partial future cash flow of an SME
for cash available at investment time to finance the SME’s funding gap. In
this way, financing constraints are in fact completely eliminated. From this
perspective, the partial guarantee we discuss here is similar to a mortgage
loan agreement, which has greatly improved our welfare level.
Appendices
Appendix A The double exponential jump-diffusion process
Clearly, Equation (1) has the following unique solution:
δt = δ0e
(µ−σ2
2
−λξ)t+σBt
Nt∏
i=1
Zi. (A.1)
Introducing the variables Yi := ln(Zi), one has
δt = δ0e
Xt , where Xt =
(
µ− σ
2
2
− λξ
)
t+ σBt +
Nt∑
i=1
Yi. (A.2)
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The random variables Yi follow an asymmetric double exponential distribu-
tion with density
f(y) = pη1e
−η1y1{y≥0} + qη2eη2y1{y<0}, η1 > 1, η2 > 0, (A.3)
where p, q ≥ 0 with p + q = 1 represent the probabilities of upward and
downward jumps. The means of the two exponential distributions are 1/η1
and 1/η2, respectively. The mean percentage jump size ξ has the solution
ξ =
pη1
η1 − 1 +
qη2
η2 + 1
− 1. (A.4)
Introduce the Laplace exponentG(·) ofX such that the moment-generating
function EQt [eβXt ] = exp[G(β)t], where G(β) is defined as (Chen and Kou,
2009)
G(β) :=
1
2
σ2β2 +
[
µ− σ
2
2
− λ
(
pη1
η1 − 1 +
qη2
η2 + 1
− 1
)]
β
+ λ
(
pη1
η1 − β +
qη2
η2 + β
− 1
)
.
(A.5)
The equation G(β) = r has four roots: β1, β2,−β3,−β4, where −∞ < −β4 <
−η2 < −β3 < 0 < β1 < η1 < β2 <∞.
Let τu(δ) be the first passage time of the “upward barrier” for the process
δ, τu(δ) = inf{t ≥ 0 : δt ≥ δu}. Let τd(δ) be the first passage time of the
“downward barrier” for the process δ, τd(δ) = inf{t ≥ 0 : δt ≤ δd}. Thanks
to Kou and Wang (2003), we obtain the following equations
EQt [e−r(τu−t)] =
η1 − β1
β2 − β1
β2
η1
(
δu
δt
)−β1
+
β2 − η1
β2 − β1
β1
η1
(
δu
δt
)−β2
, (A.6)
EQt [e−r(τu−t)δζτu ] = δ
ζ
u
[
η1 − β1
β2 − β1
β2 − ζ
η1 − ζ
(
δu
δt
)−β1
+
β2 − η1
β2 − β1
β1 − ζ
η1 − ζ
(
δu
δt
)−β2]
.
20
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
AC
CE
PT
ED
 M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
(A.7)
EQt [e−r(τd−t)] =
η2 − β3
η2
β4
β4 − β3
(
δd
δt
)β3
+
β4 − η2
η2
β3
β4 − β3
(
δd
δt
)β4
, (A.8)
EQt [e−r(τd−t)δζτd ] = δ
ζ
d
[
η2 − β3
β4 − β3
β4 + ζ
η2 + ζ
(
δd
δt
)β3
+
β4 − η2
β4 − β3
β3 + ζ
η2 + ζ
(
δd
δt
)β4]
.
(A.9)
Appendix B Solutions to option value and investment threshold
For the convenience of expressions, we introduce the following coefficients:
b1 =
η2−β3
η2
β4
β4−β3 , b2 =
β4−η2
η2
β3
β4−β3 , b3 =
η2−β3
β4−β3
β4+1
η2+1
, b4 =
β4−η2
β4−β3
β3+1
η2+1
,
b5 =
η1−β1
β2−β1
β2−1
η1−1 , b6 =
β2−η1
β2−β1
β1−1
η1−1 , b7 =
η1−β1
β2−β1
β2
η1
, b8 =
β2−η1
β2−β1
β1
η1
,
b9 =
η1−β1
β2−β1
β2+β3
η1+β3
, b10 =
β2−η1
β2−β1
β1+β3
η1+β3
, b11 =
η1−β1
β2−β1
β2+β4
η1+β4
, b12 =
β2−η1
β2−β1
β1+β4
η1+β4
.
From equation (14), the firm-maximizing investment threshold δ∗u satisfies
the equation
d0 + d1
(
δd
δu
)(−1)
+ d2
(
δd
δu
)β3
+ d3
(
δd
δu
)β4
= 0, (B.1)
where we denote:
d0 = {[(1− χp)− (1− χe)]C+gr − s(1− χp)Cr − I}(b7β1 + b8β2),
d1 = (1− χe)(b5β1 + b6β2 − 1) δdr−µ ,
d2 = (h2 − χp kCr )b1a1 − (1− χe)α δdr−µ b3a1,
d3 = (h2 − χp kCr )b2a2 − (1− χe)α δdr−µ b4a2,
a1 = b9β1 + b10β2 + β3,
a2 = b11β1 + b12β2 + β4,
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h2 = −[(1− χp)− (1− χe)]C+gr + s(1− k) (1−χp)Cr .
According to (B.1), (A.6), (A.7), and (13), the option value is given by
F =(1− χe) δu
r − µ X1 −
(
−[(1− χp)− (1− χe)]C + g
r
+ s
(1− χp)C
r
+ I
)
X2
+
(
h2 − χpkC
r
)
(b1X3 + b2X4)− (1− χe)α δd
r − µ(b3X3 + b4X4),
(B.2)
where we denote:
X1 = b5(
δeu
δt
)−β1 + b6(
δeu
δt
)−β2 ,
X2 = b7(
δeu
δt
)−β1 + b8(
δeu
δt
)−β2 ,
X3 = [b9(
δeu
δt
)−β1 + b10(
δeu
δt
)−β2 ]( δd
δeu
)β3 ,
X4 = [b11(
δeu
δt
)−β1 + b12(
δeu
δt
)−β2 ]( δd
δeu
)β4 .
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